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In present American society, a "professional"' seems to operate
under a dual moral system. He has a general moral framework governing
his actions in his personal life and a distinct professional "ethical code"
governing his professional actions. Each day the professional must fre-
quently shuttle between his private moral world and a different profes-
sional world-a world of clients, corporations, and patients. When faced
with a situation in his professional world he may respond to it in an infi-
nitely different manner than his private moral system might dictate.
The fundamental question that arises is whether the professional
needs such separate ethical norms to guide his professional conduct and
actions, or whether the person's general moral framework is adequate to
guide both his professional and private lives. The issue is significant in
view of the possible consequences of the choice made. A person uses his
moral framework to justify his action: if he chooses to follow a separate
ethical system for his professional life, then he will use that framework to
justify his professional actions. The most troubling consequence of this
last choice is that it has a significant tendency to absolve the professional
from moral responsibility for his professional actions, thus making him an
amoral, neutral technician.
The response of the legal profession, as well as other organized pro-
fessions, has been the codification of rules which are morally neutral.2
Members of these professions commonly and conveniently view these
codes as setting the boundaries of permissible legal and moral conduct. In
* Member, St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research
For the characteristics distinguishing a learned profession from other careers, see Wasser-
Strom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 1 n.1 (1975).
2 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE];
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
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doing so they leave behind their common moral framework and enclose
themselves in a world which is at best amoral. This attitude of the profes-
sional leads to behavior marked by strong role differentiation.' For law-
yers, the primary justification for this behavior is that it is necessitated
by our adversary system of justice.4
This paper will examine the sources and justifications given for the
choice of separate ethical frameworks and suggest that personal moral re-
sponsibility is essential to any ethical system. Further, it will be argued
that a professional needs both his general moral framework and the given
profession's unique principles to guide his actions. Since each individual
is a morally autonomous person and acts by choice in both his private
and professional worlds, he must accept moral responsibility for his ac-
tions and feel personally accountable for their consequences.
THE GENERAL MORAL* FRAMEWORK
A person grows up forming a personal moral character. He acquires
and develops principles through which he distinguishes right from wrong,
good from evil, and the permissible from the impermissible. After making
these distinctions he decides on a set of values with which he feels com-
fortable. Not all the morally autonomous members of a given society ad-
here to the same principles. For example, abortion is evil to some but not
to others. Nevertheless, a society is bound by some commonly accepted
moral precepts. Thus, every member accepts that murder or theft is evil,
and that the perpetrator should be punished. An individual adopts the
moral precepts common to society and supplements them with his per-
sonal ethical principles to form his general moral framework within which
he functions. He uses this framework ultimately to justify his actions.
The issue is whether this general moral framework is adequate to
guide a person in his professional life without impeding his proper func-
tioning. Moral philosophers generally do not see any socially or morally
overwhelming reasons to justify two distinct moral systems. The idea that
a person can have a different response to a particular situation depending
on whether he is acting in a personal or a professional context is repug-
nant to a moralist. This response violates an essential principle of moral
theory, that of "universalizability," which holds that if a person considers
something to be morally wrong, he should accept it as impermissible
whether done in a private or professional context. According to Professor
Gustafson, an influential contemporary moral theologian, "[t]he laudable
purpose of much moral philosophy is to find a common basis for morality
See infra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
* See infra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
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to which all persons from all historical communities might adhere." 5
Some legal scholars also have adopted this principle, advocating a
general moral framework. Professor Wasserstrom suggests the "deprofes-
sionalization" of legal services as a way to return to the general moral
framework and the responsibility it entails.' The lawyers who have
adopted this position are alarmed by the actual and potential conse-
quences of moral abdication inherent in the "separate morality"
principle.7
Abolishing the distinct professional code is not an adequate solution.
A professional frequently faces unique situations in his practice for which
his general moral framework does not provide the desired guidance. A
professional code can assist him in resolving these problems. The ethical
precepts of such a code, however, should be commonly accepted and mor-
ally "universalizable" principles-at least within the professional's uni-
verse. The problem with the current professional codes, however, is two-
fold. On the one hand, the morally neutral codified rules are viewed as a
moral framework. On the other hand, they are observed as a separate and
distinct ethical system by the profession.
The private and professional aspects of a person's life are not distinct
and separate. They constantly permeate each other and together make up
the whole person. It is practically impossible to keep the two aspects of
life completely apart. As long as a person preserves his moral autonomy
he is one person and has one life, no matter how multi-faceted it may be.
His professional life is an integral part of his private life at all times, and
vice-versa. There is a constant flow of influencing factors between the va-
rious aspects of a person's life. Similarly, the moral principles guiding a
person's professional life should be an integral part of his general moral
framework and consistent with it. Otherwise, as one philosopher has re-
J. GUSTAFSON, ETHICS FROM A THEOCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE 76 (1981); see Veatch, Medical
Ethics: Professional or Universal ?, 65 HARv. THEOLOGICAL REV. 531, 541-43 (1971).
Morality has been commonly viewed as either identical with or at least based on reli-
gious beliefs. Religiously based morality also seeks universal principles to justify its beliefs,
and thus, the multiplicity of religious and cultural traditions is not an impediment to having
a "universalizable" moral framework. Professor Gustafson, whose ethics are rooted in the
Christian tradition, writes that:
With the more radical secularization of Western culture in recent centuries, and with
the growing knowledge of cultural pluralism and various vital religious traditions, it
has not been unreasonable to seek a basis for morality that transcends [particular]
religious beliefs, one that can be held to by persons holding different religious beliefs
and that would appeal to all "rational" and "autonomous" agents.
J. GUSTAFSON, supra, at 76.
' Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 12.
" See, e.g., Noonan, Other Peoples' Morals: The Lawyer's Conscience, 48 TENN. L. REv. 227,
230 (1981); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 Wis. L. REv. 30, 131; Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 3.
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marked, "when professional action is estranged from ordinary moral ex-
perience, the lawyer's sensitivity to the moral costs in both ordinary and
[professional] situations tends to atrophy."'
ROLE-DIFFERENTIATED ETHICS
Role-differentiated behavior comes into play when a person breaks
life into separate and distinct units. The person lives and acts in his per-
sonal life according to his general moral framework. In his professional
life, he is playing a "role" according to a general script provided by his
profession.' It is analogous to actors performing on stage. Since he is "role
playing," the actor does not see himself as morally responsible for the
acts of the character he plays, nor does he expect others to hold him re-
sponsible. This analogy overlooks one critical difference between a stage
role and a professional role; while an audience knows actors are role-play-
ing on stage, people in the real world consult responsible identifiable pro-
fessionals for specialized services.
The legal profession has a long tradition of codifying rules of conduct
for its members. The American Bar Association's Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (the "Code") or its successor the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (the "Model Rules") is currently in effect in every
state. The Code, with which we are primarily concerned here, has some
"aspirational" ethical considerations, but the mandatory disciplinary
rules 0 are essentially morally indifferent. This incongruity has led one
commentator to remark that:
[a]t the very least, there is something odd about a code of professional
behavior which admonishes lawyers to attempt to prevent their clients from
engaging in "unjust" conduct (impliedly conceding that this is an identifi-
able genus), and yet permits them to go forward without fear of reproach if
the client is adamant."
' Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 79 (1980).
' For a comprehensive discussion of the psychological reasons and consequences of the role
as a mask, see T. SHAFFER & J. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL
(1987).
'0 See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, at Preliminary Statement. "Ethical Considerations are
aspirational in character. . . .The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations,
are mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum conduct below
which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." Id.
" Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 691
(1978).
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
This Code's odd nature and its consideration as a distinct framework for
ethical conduct lead to behavior by lawyers that is strongly role
differentiated.
This kind of behavior is not a creature of the organized american bar.
The concept that professional and private lives have different rules seems
to have its roots in antiquity. 2 This type of vicarious detachment from
the self in order to serve clients has its model in classical Stoicism, which
permitted adopting a client's problem while staying detached from the
self.'" A strong medieval expression of this concept is found in
Montaigne, who believed in complete separation of his private and public
lives. Montaigne stated his position unequivocally: "I have been able to
concern myself with public affairs without moving the length of my nail
from myself. . . . The mayor and Montaigne have always been two peo-
ple, clearly separated."' 4
This dichotomy was not always part of American legal ethics. The
few writings on the subject that precede the formation of the American
Bar Association do not reflect such a division.' 5 The doctrine of a sepa-
rate morality for a lawyer's professional life-what the profession calls
the "adversary ethic"-has been the central concept of American legal
ethics only for about the last century. Professor Shaffer attributes its rise
to prominence to the American Industrial Revolution. He writes that
"[t]he adversary ethic appeared in the legal profession's collective moral-
ity at about the time lawyers . . . began acting for the robber barons of
the American industrial revolution. Or, more accurately, it appeared when
lawyers began to defend themselves for acting for the robber barons."16
The bar's response, however, is that this ethic is necessary to enable the
lawyer to carry out his functions in an adversary system of justice.
The Adversary System
The adversary system is commonly described as an American legal
theory which holds that truth is best discovered and justice done when
the two opposing parties present their cases before an impartial judge and
" See T. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 79 (1987).
13 See Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 19-20 (1951).
I d. at 20 (quoting IV Essais de Montaigne 152-53 (Charpentier, Variorum ed. 1876)). The
benefits of this separation are, to say the least, dubious. As St. Thomas More stated: "I
believe, when statesmen forsake their private conscience for the sake of their public duties
... they lead their country by a short route to chaos." Quoted in T. SHAFFER, AMERICAN
LEGAL ETHICS 170 (1985).
lB See T. SHAFFER, supra note 12, at 59. For example, Judge Jones' 1887 ALABAMA CODE FOR
LAWYERS states: "[tihe attorney's office does not destroy man's accountability to the Creator
... and the obligation to his neighbor." Id.
" T. SHAFFER, supra note 12, at 85.
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jury. 17 The Code recognizes this system as the law of the land, and asserts
that a lawyer has certain duties to maintain the system's integrity." The
Code clearly states that "[t]he duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty
to the legal system are the same: to represent his client zealously within
the bounds of the law."' 9 The norm required to carry out this duty is
advocacy, whereby the lawyer advocates his client's position and fights on
his behalf. This kind of advocacy, notwithstanding statements in the
Code to the contrary, inevitably implies adoption and identification of the
lawyer with the client and/or the client's position. Since the lawyer-as-
person may not desire to be so identified, he ascribes his actions to his
"role" in the system. While some lawyers may be able to keep a moral
and psychological distance from that "role," indications are that there is
still a high degree of identification.20 However, as the Code also recog-
nizes, the practice of law not only entails advocacy but also involves coun-
seling and other types of technical assistance to clients.2 The adversary
system, thus, cannot be the sole culprit for this behavior. As Professor
Wasserstrom has observed, "much, if not most, of what lawyers do has
nothing directly to do with the adversary system or even with the settle-
ment of disputes."2
Under this role-differentiated model a lawyer may do for a client
what he would not do for himself because of his general ethical frame-
" The term "adversary system" is used to distinguish the American system from the "in-
quisitorial" or "interrogative" system most common in Civil Law countries in which the
judge conducts the actual investigation. The adversary system is not without its critics.
Dean Roscoe Pound challenged the belief of the system's fairness as early as 1906. See 29
A.B.A. REPS. 395 (1917). One of the most vocal and persuasive contemporary critics is Judge
Marvin Frankel. See M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE passim (1980); Frankel, The Search For
Truth-An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1032-40 (1975). See generally
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823 passim (1985)
(arguing non-adversarial judicial investigation is superior to adversarial).
One flaw of the adversary system is its assumption that the parties are equally repre-
sented. However, it is fair to state that "[h]ow frequently those presuppositions hold is open
to question in a social order that tolerates vast disparities in wealth, renders most litigation
enormously expensive, and allocates civil legal assistance almost entirely through market
mechanism. Under these circumstances, one would expect that the 'haves' generally come
out ahead." Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985),
reprinted in G. HAZARD & D. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY & REGULATION
170, 171 (1988).
" MODEL CODE, supra note 2, at EC 7-19 to 7-39.
" Id. at EC 7-19.
20 See Postema, supra note 8, at 76.
2 See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 2, at EC 3-3 & 7-5.
22 Wasserstrom, Moral Considerations in Professional Responsibility, in P. KEENAN, TEACH-
ING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 859, 862 (1979); see also Shaffer, Christian Theories of
Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 721, 727 (1975) (discussing substantial effect
of decisions made within attorney's office).
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work. For example, although he personally opposes asserting the defense
of the statute of limitations to avoid a just personal debt, he may, and
upon the client's insistence he must, assert it to help the client avoid pay-
ing a just debt. Commenting on this acting-for-the-client, Professor Noo-
nan, a critic of the system, writes:
While I understand the attractiveness and even the inescapability of the
catch phrase, "I'm doing it for my client," I also see the phrase functioning
as a kind of carapace. The phrase functions as a defense against various
moral claims, a defense against empathy with someone else's feelings, a de-
fense against responsibility. If a lawyer can utter this incantation and can
take it seriously enough, responsibility and the feelings accompanying it are
shifted to the client.2 3
This shifting of the responsibility makes the lawyer comfortable in his
"role." This "portrait of the lawyer as merely a technical adviser and
spokesperson is false. The fact is that the modern legal adviser is an actor
in the situations in which he gives advice. And as such he is
accountable."
24
As a corollary to the adversary system, the Bar has also developed
the myth that the legal profession is a social "institution" and hence
above each individual member. This myth finds its lofty expression in the
Code's statement that: "[11awyers as guardians of the law, play a vital role
in the preservation of society. '2 5 The existence of such an institutional
entity, if indeed true, could very well have justified role-differentiated be-
havior. It would even have connoted a sacrifice of personal principles in
order to achieve the goals of the institution's higher social and moral or-
der. However, the comments of one lawyer on the behavior of the profes-
sion in response to problematic situations seem more apt than the idealis-
tic statement of the Code. He writes:
[t]he lawyer's response takes the form of a dialectic of cynicism and naivete.
On one hand, he sees his more degrading activities as licensed by a funda-
mental amorality lying beneath conventional morality. On the other hand,
he sees his move heartening ones as serving an instituitonal justice higher
than conventional morality"
The fact, of course, is that lawyers are not an "institution" serving a func-
tion as a corporate body; they are merely skilled individuals serving other
members of society within a legal system.
From a sociological perspective, justification for role-differentiated
behavior requires a showing that the behavior is essential or necessary to
23 Noonan, supra note 7, at 230.
2 G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 151 (1978).
2" MODEL CODE, supra note 2, at Preamble.
26 Simon, supra note 7, at 30.
32 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 4
fulfill an institution's function. Furthermore, as one sociologist has writ-
ten, "the institution in question must serve a vital moral function in soci-
ety. . . .It [must] be shown that some central institutional value will fail
to be realized . . . and that the realization of this value is worth the
moral price paid for strong role-differentiation." 7 The application of this
standard clearly demonstrates that legal practitioners' role-differentiated
behavior is not justified. The only group of lawyers who may qualify
under this standard would be the judiciary, which can justifiably be con-
sidered an institution. As judges, they may sometimes be required to ap-
ply the law in a manner contrary to their personal ethics. 2 8 To illustrate,
if a litigant asserts a valid statute of limitations defense to a just debt,
the judge must uphold the defense. Judges have a vital institutional social
function and the value gained for this moral price is stability, consistency,
and the equal application of the law. Occasional injustice to an individual




Canon 7 of the Code states that "[a] lawyer should represent a client
zealously within the bounds of the law."3 This is the "axiomatic norm"'"
expected of the lawyer. One cannot help but notice the glaring absence of
any reference to ethical or moral bounds. Thus, the lawyer zealously ad-
vocates his client's position so long as the client's demands are "within
the bounds of the law," without inquiring into any other motives or possi-
ble consequences. Despite all the supposed safeguards in the Code this
type of "zealous advocacy" can often lead to overstepping the bounds of
the law. The observation of Professor Hazard, a cautious supporter of the
adversary system, describes this path quite succinctly. He writes that in
zealous advocacy "[liegitimate and illegitimate techniques shade into
each other-vigorous maneuver into harassment, careful preparation of
witnesses into subornation of perjury, non-disclosure into destruction of
evidence. At some point in deterioration of rules of form, an expert in
rough and tumble becomes simply a thug."32
This requirement of zealous advocacy within an adversary proceeding
leads to behavior with a high level of role-differentiation. Even though
11 A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics 7 (19 80). For a generally
critical review of Goldman's book by a lawyer, see Kaufman, Book Review, 94 HARv. L. REV.
1504 (1981).
" See A. GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 39.
See id. at 38-49.
MODEL CODE, supra note 2, Canon 7.
Id. at Preliminary Statement.
32 G. HAZARD, supra note 24, at 132-33.
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 345
the Code states that zealous advocacy "implies no obligation to adopt a
personal viewpoint favorable to the interests or desires of his client,"3 3 for
all practical purposes the attorney makes that adoption, and the public
views it as such. A telling example of how far this zeal can go is the posi-
tion taken by former Justice Fortas of the United States Supreme Court:
If the interest of the client required the lawyer to advocate a position or
seek a result which he personally disliked or even which he considered con-
trary to society's welfare, it was the lawyer's duty to do so with all his mind
and heart, subject only to the restrictions and proprieties which the rules
and conventions impose."'
Ethical Consideration 7-1 of the Code makes it abundantly clear that
a lawyer owes a duty of loyalty and zeal to the client who seeks "any
lawful objective through legally permissible means. 3 5 It was perhaps this
kind of emphasis on using the bounds of the law alone as the standard
along with its total absence of ethical considerations that led the exiled
Russian writer Solzhenitsyn to criticize our present society and make a
bleak forecast for its future. In addressing a graduating class of a decade
ago he said:
[e]verybody operates at the extreme limit of those legal frames. . . .A soci-
ety which is based on the letter of the law and never reaches any higher is
taking very scarce advantage of the high level of human possibilities ...
Whenever the tissue of life is woven of legalistic relations, there is an atmo-
sphere of moral mediocrity, paralyzing man's noblest impulses. 6
In practice, the zealous advocacy model has changed the purpose of
the legal system from an exercise in the search for truth and justice to a
duel to prevail over the opponent at any cost. One lawyer was not far off
the mark when he commented that "[a]pocryphal defense lawyers have
been known to assert: 'My clients don't want justice, they want to get off.'
. . .[A]ttorneys are in effect selling their services to clients to help them
defeat the public interest in truth-seeking. 3 7 This concept of justice is
advanced to justify role-differentiated behavior and its accordant comfort
of "immunity from responsibility."" This type of advocacy rewards a law-
yer for being "competitive rather than cooperative; aggressive rather than
" MODEL CODE, supra note 2, at EC 7-17.
" Fortas, Thurman Arnold and the Theater of the Law, 79 YALE L.J. 988, 996 (1970). It is
noteworthy that the words used parallel the Biblical words used to describe the person's
devotion to God. See Deuteronomy 6:5; Matthew 22:37.
" MODEL CODE, supra note 2, at EC 7-1 (emphasis added).
"6 Address by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Harvard University Commencement Address (June
8, 1978). For reference to this speech, see N.Y. Times, June 9, 1978, at AS, col. 3.
Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARv. L. REV. 702, 737
(1977).
38 G. HAZARD, supra note 24, at 151.
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accommodating; ruthless rather than compassionate; and pragmatic
rather than principled."
S9
Shedding this "role" and becoming personally accountable will not
necessarily dampen the zeal needed for proper representation. A lawyer
who feels morally responsible for his conduct and its consequences will
represent a client conscientiously because he will feel accountable for any
injury he may cause his client. When the lawyer feels morally responsible
for his actions he will give serious effect to the token statements of the
Code which suggest that lawyers may take actions which are both legal
and morally just. One of the Code's "aspirations" states that "[in assist-
ing his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer
to point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally
just as well as legally permissible. 4 And when the client insists on a
course of action which is in his best interest but contrary to the lawyer's
conscience, the lawyer "may ask his client for permission to forego such
action, 141 or refuse to aid him in the realization of an immoral project.
The obvious tonal difference between the above isolated "aspirational"
comments and the strong unequivocal statements on the duty of zealous
representation clearly indicates the bar's approval of role-differentiated
behavior.
Making Legal Services Available to All
Lawyers are expected to make their expert services available to all
who may need them. One of the Code's aspirations is that "persons una-
ble to pay all or a portion of a reasonable fee should be able to obtain
necessary legal services. '42 Nevertheless, the Code does not require a law-
yer to take on every client that comes along and also allows withdrawal
from representation for a variety of reasons..4 The aspiration to make ser-
vices available to everybody, the argument runs, requires that a lawyer
put aside his personal preference or moral principles-otherwise the un-
popular clients and causes will not find legal representation. It would ap-
pear, however, that the imposition of moral responsibility on lawyers will
enhance legal representation by making lawyers more directly accounta-
ble for their professional conduct without significantly restricting the
availability of legal services. For the responsible lawyer, the issue would
not be the character of the client or the cause; he simply would be making
a conscious decision during the representation not to violate his own
39 Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 13.
40 MODEL CODE, supra note 2, at EC 7-8.
"' Id. at EC 7-9.
2 Id. at EC 2-16.
43 See, e.g., id. at EC 2-20, 7-4, 7-6, DR 2-109, 1-102(A).
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moral principles while acting on behalf of his client. "Unpopular" causes
and clients would still find representation. First, considering the diversity
of the moral framework of individuals, such causes and clients may not be
unpopular for many lawyers. Second, representing a cause of client
should not denote identification with that client or that cause, nor neces-
sarily sympathy with it. The lawyer is not responsible for what his client
did; he is merely responsible and accountable for his own actions. In mak-
ing moral decisions for himself, the lawyer is not coercing the client to act
in a manner consistent with the lawyer's moral standards; he merely de-
cides to aid or to refuse aid to the client. In either case he is personally
responsible and morally accountable for his choice.
Client Autonomy
The Code makes it abundantly clear that the client has the final say.
While the Code allows the lawyer to give his moral opinion, it clearly
states that "[iun the final analysis ... the lawyer should always remem-
ber that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or
methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not
for himself."" The Code further states that "the authority to make deci-
sions is exclusively that of the client and, if made within the framework
of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer." '4 5
Some argue that the lawyer's raising of moral considerations in his
representation would impinge on the client's autonomy. This emphasis on
the client's autonomy fails to recognize the parallel autonomy of the law-
yer. It makes him a skilled technician acting at the bidding of his client.
In a sense, he is no different from a sophisticated computer responding to
the instructions of the programmer. If this seems to have a dehumanizing
effect on the lawyer, it has, as we shall see, an equally dehumanizing ef-
fect on the client.
The attorney-client relationship is a human interaction. At its best, it
is an enabling relationship rather than one intended for exploitation.46 As
the enabler, the professional is an active contributor toward the realiza-
tion of the client's objectives, and shares in the responsibility for them.
When the client is interested in using the expert skills of the lawyer to
exploit the system, or somebody else, and the lawyer willingly partici-
pates, he should be equally responsible for the misdeed and its conse-
quences. In actual practice the relationship is not one between equals.
Clearly the lawyer dominates, and thus should be held even more
" Id. at EC 7-8.
"5 Id. at EC 7-7.
"6 See D. REECK, ETHICS FOR THE PROFESSIONS-A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 39 (1982).
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accountable."7
When the lawyer raises moral issues he is not acting in a paternalistic
or an elitist manner. "Lawyers, like anybody else in the world, can know
that there are some things that it's wrong to do."'48 Indeed when the law-
yer fails to raise ethical concerns he is abdicating his moral duty. More-
over, in raising moral issues the lawyer implies that he considers the cli-
ent not as another "thing", "case", or "problem" but as another
autonomous person who at that moment happens to be in need of the
lawyer's specialized skills. The lawyer who raises moral issues follows the
Kantian principle of treating the person as an end in himself, rather than
as a means to something. For theologians, this is the "human dignity of
the professional relationships. '4 9 Non-lawyers seem to be better equipped
to see the dehumanizing dimensions of the lawyer-client relationship. The
amoral stand adopted by the lawyer has a similar effect on the client's
outlook because "[tihe client may in fact lose his own sense of moral re-
sponsibility when he sees his most partisan interests warmly embraced
and given institutional respectability by his lawyer."5
The lawyer-client relationship is primarily an economic one. The law-
yer sells his skills and gives preferential treatment to his client in order to
accomplish the client's objective. There is nothing morally flawed about
making an honest living from providing such needed services. The Bar,
however, attempts to describe the relationship in non-economic terms,
perhaps because it feels that the economic basis of the relationship is de-
grading to the profession.
An example of the desire to describe the relationship in terms that
do not embrace the reality is Professor Fried's "friendship" analogy.' He
describes the lawyer as a "limited purpose friend" or "legal friend" of the
client. The author, using what he calls a classic definition of the word,
writes that a "lawyer is a friend in regard to the legal system. . . .That
means that like a friend he acts in your interest, not his own; or rather he
adopts your interest as his own."'52 A person would naturally prefer his
friend over a stranger, but this analogy is not required to justify a law-
yer's preferential treatment of his client. Further, Professor Fried makes
this a one-way "friendship" where the client makes the decisions and the
lawyer adopts them, and this makes the lawyer a good person.5 3 In a nor-
,7 See Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 19.
's Wasserstrom, supra note 22, at 863.
4 D. REECK, supra note 46, at 51.
50 A. GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 126.
" Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85
YALE L.J. 1060, 1060-89 (1976).
2 Id. at 1071.
" Id. at 1083-84.
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mal friendship, however, there is constant interaction and mutual influ-
ence. In response to Fried's article, Professors Dauer and Leff wrote that
"the lawyer achieves his 'goodness' by being-professionally-no rottener
[sic] than the generality of people acting, so to speak, as amateurs." 54
Another view is that of looking at the lawyer as the alter ego of the
client. Here the "principal duty of the lawyer is to exercise his 'profes-
sional judgment' for the client. . . .The lawyer becomes the client's 'legal
judgment,' but should exercise this faculty exactly the way the client
would if he had it himself. s5 The obvious implication of this view is that
the lawyer has to take the actions which are most advantageous to the
client, regardless of their morality. This suggestion unfairly imputes to
clients a lack of moral framework. Not every client would want to choose
a legally permissible course of action that is unjust or morally
objectionable.
In an ethical system where the lawyer is personally accountable, the
autonomy of the client is preserved and even enhanced along with that of
the lawyer himself. Preferring the interests of the client over those of
non-clients is not inherently wrong. As long as the lawyer can attend to
those interests in a morally acceptable way, and be rewarded for it, he is
involved in a healthy human relationship involving two morally autono-
mous persons.
PERSONAL MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
A framework of ethical principles provides the ultimate justifying
reasons for an action taken. The framework recognizes the moral auton,
omy of the person and his freedom to choose one course of action over
another. This in turn means assuming responsibility for the consequences
of that action. The Code does not constitute a moral framework in this
sense. Professor Shaffer rightfully laments that "what [the profession]
calls ethics are traffic regulations that make professional intercourse effi-
cient and keep professional practice at least (and often at most) within
the boundaries set by the criminal law.""6
The Code suggests that the lawyer has no obligation to respect the
moral rights of others when they conflict with his client's legal rights.
This notion "effectively absolve[s] the lawyer of moral responsibility."57
The Code develops a professional world which is a "simplified moral
world; often it is an amoral one; and more than occasionally, perhaps, an
Dauer & Leff, The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 582 (1977).
Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1244, 1254 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
56 T. SHAFFER, supra note 12, at 131.
57 A. GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 95.
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overtly immoral one."" s Like most simplified things, this world becomes a
very comfortable one in which to reside. It also seems to be a favored
place because there seems to be no moral personal accountability there.
The organized bar expects high ethical standards only as an ideal. 9
For the bar, the ultimate incentive for a lawyer to meet these aspirational
moral standards is "the desire for the respect and confidence of the mem-
bers of his profession and of the society which he serves."60 If the respect
and confidence of the public provide any indication, this incentive has not
worked very well."
The picture of this simplified moral world of non-accountability is a
refuge for self-deception. To illustrate this point, Professor Shaffer cites
the example of prominent Nazis who did not consider it their duty to
consider the moral aspects of their involvement, and adds: "vicarious mo-
rality leads to excuses for monumental horrors. . . .Schizophrenia is not




The person deceives himself in an attempt to justify the unjustifi-
able. Referring to this kind of self-deception, the existentialist philoso-
pher Sartre remarked that man is not what "he conceives himself to be,
but he is what he wills . ..[and] is responsible for what he is." '6 3 While
Sartre, true to his existentialist principles, would not pass an external
judgment of the person's choice, he would not hesitate to call that person
a "self-deceiver" and a "coward."6 The metaphor of the coward is partic-
ularly appropriate. It denotes the lack of courage to do right, to resist
wrong, and, especially, to accept moral responsibility for one's choices.
Scholars troubled with the status quo have suggested alternative sys-
tems for professional conduct. Goldman, a sociologist, suggests that law-
yers should aid their clients to get "only that to which they have moral
rights. 6 5 Thus sometimes lawyers may have to forego their clients' legal
rights, but at other times may have to exceed legal bounds to get that to
" Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 2.
' See MODEL CODE, supra note 2, at Preamble. The ABA promulgated the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in 1983 as a substitute for the Code. As far as moral and ethical
precepts are concerned there are no substantive differences between the two.
60 Id.
" The public distrust and dislike of lawyers is clear from public opinion polls. See, e.g., B.
CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 227-58
(1977); Burger, The Role of the Law School in the Teaching of Legal Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377, 379 (1980). For some lawyer horror stories,
on the subject see J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE-LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA (1976); M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS (1968).
02 T. SHAFFER, supra note 12, at 97.
63 J. SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM AND HUMANISM 28-29 (Tr. P. Mairet trans. 1977).
1, Id. at 51-52.
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which the client has a moral right. This alternative does not take into
consideration the incentives to frequently exceed the legal boundaries
and the consequences of those actions. More importantly, however, from
a moral point of view, it is the client's moral rights alone that determine
the lawyer's course of action. In this system the lawyer can again avoid
moral responsibility for his actions if they were moral from the client's
perspective.
The suggestions of "deprofessionalization" and adequacy of the per-
son's general moral framework66 do not adequately take into considera-
tion the unique situations a lawyer may face. While under such a theory
the lawyer would be accountable for his actions, he would not have ade-
quate principles to guide him. Others would like to see a further classifi-
cation of the profession. In this system advocate-lawyers and all criminal
law practitioners would be absolved from moral responsibility, whereas
the non-advocate lawyers would be held accountable . 7 Besides the intro-
duction of a double standard within the profession, this suggestion seems
to imply that it is necessary or acceptable to behave immorally in an ad-
vocacy situation. This would also require the impractical task of clear de-
lineation between advocacy and non-advocacy practice. Professor Hazard
has offered to introduce the tort concept of "the reasonable person" stan-
dard to determine when a lawyer should be held accountable and when
not." This may sound attractive, but it introduces an alien, largely objec-
tive element into the subjective area of morality.
Since moral autonomy necessarily implies accountability, any ethical
system must include that element in it. For the lawyer, the moral frame-
work problem can be resolved first, by rejecting the principle of separate
morality which violates the holistic nature of the person; and second, by
recognizing an expanded moral framework covering all the aspects of the
person's life. This unification would also permit the "cross-fertilization of
moral experience necessary for personal and professional growth."69 This
moral framework would not make life easier. To the contrary, since it
abolishes the simplified morality of the professional world, the framework
would make it more difficult to make decisions. The reward for the diffi-
culty would be the comfort of being able to justify those decisions on
moral grounds and the courage of assuming responsibility for their
consequences.
86 See Simon, supra note 7, at 131; Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 19.
See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 673, 695.
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THE FAILURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION
The basic premise of legal education seems to be to teach students
"to think like a lawyer." Law school curricula are generally highly struc-
tured and systematized. Despite this organization, the teaching of ethics
in law schools is "mismanaged and chaotic" and in dire need of reform.7"
The current teaching of ethics consists mainly of a course in "Professional
Responsibility" which is simply an exposition of the Code or Model
Rules. This instruction in "negative ethics," essentially trains students
how to avoid getting into trouble.7
Some alternative forms of ethical instruction are currently used.
These methods include: teaching ethics by using stories from inside and
outside of the profession,7 2 having outside practitioners teach the course
so they may bring a concrete perspective to the problems, 7 and using the
clinical method.74 There has also been a very useful suggestion of utilizing
non-lawyer specialists in teaching ethics.75
It is true that by the time a person starts law school he has already
formed a character that aides him "in doing the right things and [gives
him] courage in resisting the wrong."76 Nevertheless, it is not too late to
teach ethical responsibility. A former Chief Justice of the United States
considered the teaching of ethics to law students equal in importance to,
if not more important than, teaching substantive and procedural law, and
emphasized that law schools have a duty to inculcate moral principles.77
As long as law schools fail in this duty, they prepare, at best, "amoral
technicians" instead of morally autonomous skilled persons. This perhaps
justifies the remark of a law student that "law school teaches students to
deal with every conceivable loss, that of an arm, a leg, five dollars, a
wife-every one, that is, but the most important, the loss of one's self. '"
The amoral (perhaps even immoral) legal technician, who loses his
self and his moral autonomy, and abdicates moral responsibility, becomes
a perfect tool for exploitation. This is not the ideal toward which the pro-
fessional aspires. In former Chief Justice Burger's words:
70 Gee, Legal Ethics Education and the Dynamics of Reform, 31 CATH. LAW. 203, 203
(1987).
"1 Bresnahan, Ethics and the Study and Practice of Law: The Problem of Being Profes-
sional in a Fuller Sense, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 189, 189 (1976).
72 See T. SHAFFER, supra note 12, at 14.
73 See Joiner, Teaching Professional Responsibility, 64 A.B.A. J. 551, 553 (1978).
" See Leleiko, Love, Professional Responsibility, the Rule of Law, and Clinical Legal Edu-
cation, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 641, 641-61 (1980).
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[lawyers] must be more than skilled legal technicians. We should be that,
but in a larger sense, we must be legal architects, engineers, builders, and
from time to time, inventors as well. We have served, and must continue to
see our role, as problem-solvers, harmonizers, and peacemakers, the heal-
ers-not the promoters-of conflict.79
Legal education has succeeded superbly in training students "to
think like lawyers," if that phrase means producing skilled legal techni-
cians. In order to succeed completely, however, legal education must ex-
pand its objectives by also inculcating a sense of moral responsibility in
the students. The motto used in greeting entering law students should be:
"We will teach you how to think like a lawyer and how to act respon-
sibly as one."
CONCLUSION
The moral framework in which we function is the ultimate justifica-
tion for our actions. The concept of dual morality for professionals sug-
gests a false dichotomy in the life of a person. The lawyer does not need a
"role" to fulfill his essential social functions. He can carry out his duties
to their full extent by being a morally autonomous and responsible per-
son. The idea of the role involves both self-deception and abdication from
responsibility and invites immoral conduct. This artificial dichotomy of
the person has a dehumanizing effect on both the lawyer and his client.
The lawyer becomes a mere legal technician, while the client becomes a
"thing," and both lose their personality. The inevitable result of the dom-
inance which the principle of separate ethics holds over the legal profes-
sion is pervasive moral failure. And, as Professor Shaffer writes, "[w]hat
seems to bind together these instances of [moral failure] . . . is that they
did what everyone else was doing. In every instance the plea in defense is
vitia temporis (everybody's doing it)."8
"' Burger, supra note 61, at 378.
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